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a lower financial return from an investment that also produced social benefits. An 
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profits. Some seek investments that are aligned with their social values (value 
alignment), for example by only owning stock in companies whose activities are 
consistent with the investor’s moral or social values. Others may also want their 
investment to make portfolio companies create more social value (social value 
creation). The thrust of this essay is that while it is relatively easy to achieve 
value alignment, creating social value is far more difficult. The literature published 
by asset managers, foundations, and trade associations voices considerable 
optimism that socially-motivated investors can create social value, particularly 
through non-concessionary investments. We are skeptical about many of these 
assertions; their language is often too loose to support a disciplined assessment 
whether social value was created, and the absence of fees keyed to social, rather 
than financial, value creation fuels that skepticism. To address this problem, we 
first offer a taxonomy of socially-motivated investments so that investors can 
clearly articulate their goals, and asset managers can clearly articulate what they 
offer and how their performance should be measured. We then address three big 
questions. First, can investments in public companies create social value whether 
or not with concessions on return? Second, can investments in private companies 
create social value, again whether or not with return concessions? Third, can 
investors, working with socially motivated stakeholders, cause public companies 
to create social value?
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Abstract 
 
Most investors have a single goal: to earn the highest 
financial return.  These socially-neutral investors maximize their risk-
adjusted returns and would not accept a lower financial return from 
an investment that also produced social benefits.  An increasing 
number of socially-motivated investors have goals beyond maximizing 
profits.  Some seek investments that are aligned with their social 
values (value alignment), for example by only owning stock in 
companies whose activities are consistent with the investor’s moral or 
social values.  Others may also want their investment to make portfolio 
companies create more social value (social value creation).    
The thrust of this essay is that while it is relatively easy to 
achieve value alignment, creating social value is far more difficult.   
The literature published by asset managers, foundations, and 
trade associations voices considerable optimism that socially-
motivated investors can create social value, particularly through non-
concessionary investments.  We are skeptical about many of these 
assertions; their language is often too loose to support a disciplined 
assessment whether social value was created, and the absence of fees 
keyed to social, rather than financial, value creation fuels that 
skepticism.  To address this problem, we first offer a taxonomy of 
socially-motivated investments so that investors can clearly articulate 
their goals, and asset managers can clearly articulate what they offer 
and how their performance should be measured.   
We then address three big questions.  First, can investments 
in public companies create social value whether or not with 
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 Ronald J. Gilson is the Stern Professor of Law and Business at Columbia Law School 
and the Meyers Professor of Law and Business emeritus at Stanford Law School.   
 Mark Wolfson is a founder and Managing Partner of Jasper Ridge Partners, Consulting 
Professor in Accounting and Finance at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and President of 
Jasper Ridge Charitable Fund.  An earlier version of this essay appeared in the STAN. SOC. & INNOV. 
REV., Paul Brest, Ronald Gilson & Mark Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value 
(Dec. 9, 2016 06:14 AM), https://ssir.org/up_for_debate/article/how_investors_ 
can_and_cant_create_social_value. We are grateful for comments by participants at the Stanford and 
Columbia Law School faculty workshops, and at the faculty workshop at the Wharton School of 
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concessions on return?  Second, can investments in private companies 
create social value, again whether or not with return concessions? 
Third, can investors, working with socially motivated stakeholders, 
cause public companies to create social value? 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Most investors throughout the world have a single goal: to earn 
the highest risk-adjusted financial returns.  They would not accept a lower 
financial return from an investment that also produced social benefits.   
More recently, an increasing number of socially-motivated 
investors have goals beyond maximizing profits.1  They seek to align their 
investments with their social values (value alignment), and some also may  
seek to cause the companies in which they invest to create more social 
value as a result of their investment (social value creation).  We show in 
                                                                                                             
1 The most common reference for the amount of assets under management that take 
socially-related issues into account in their investment strategies is that offered by the US SIF. US SIF 
and US SIF FOUND., Report on U.S. Sustained, Responsible and Impact Investors Trends (11 th ed. 
2016), available at http://www.cii.org/files/events/2016/CI%20and %20US%20SIF%20Trends 
%202016%20presentation.pdf.  It reports that assets under management within three categories – 
sustainable, responsible and impact investing –  increased from $6.57 trillion as of January 1, 2014 to 
$8.72 trillion on January 1, 2017, representing some 20 percent of U.S. assets under management.  
See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co., Investing with Impact, Creating Economic, Social and 
Environmental Value (Feb. 2017), https://www.morganstanley .com/assets/pdfs/articles/investing-
with-impact.pdf ((last visited March 3, 2018), which adopts the SIF calculation.  This quantification 
establishes that an expansive construction of the environmental, social and governance categories 
(“ESG”) results in a substantial amount of assets that fall into this very broad bucket.  Fund Directions, 
a mutual fund trade publication, brings part of the calculation current by reporting that ESG-focused 
public mutual funds had $2.9 billion in net investment inflows during 2017, compared to $4.8 billion 
during 2016, in both cases periods when actively managed general equity mutual funds lost large 
amounts of assets.  Yun Li, Demand for Sustainable Investments Soars, Fund Investments (July 10, 
2017 12:30 PM), http://fundintelligence.global./fundaction/news/morningstar-demand-for-
sustainable-investments-soars.  (last visited March 3, 2018).  2017 also saw 5 new ESG funds launched 
that offer investors more choices focusing on sustainable portfolios (Morningstar Now Informs 
Investors About ESG/Sustainable Mutual Funds – And The Good News is That ESG Funds’ AUM 
Continues to Grow (Oct. 24, 2017), https://ga-institute.com/Sustainability-
Update/2017/10/24/morningstar-now-informs-investors-about-esgsustainable-mutual-funds-and-the-
good-news-is-that-esg-funds-aum-continues-to-grow (last visited March 3, 2018)). 
A related measure of investor interest is the growth in the number of financial terminal 
clients who access ESG data for their analysis.  For example, Bloomberg reports that the number of 
global clients  This number represents approximately 3.7% of the total number of Bloomberg’s 
subscribers who seek such information grew from 3,010 in 2010 to 12,242 in 2016. See Bloomberg, 
2016 Impact Report, https://data.bloomberglp.com/company/sites/28/2017/05/17_0516_Impact-
Book_Final.pdf (last visited March 3, 2018). 
However, as we discuss in more detail in the remainder of this essay, the broad bucket ESG 
definition lumps together very different activities; for example, traditional fundamental analysis that 
in certain industries, for example oil, necessarily involves assessment of the impact of climate change 
on future fossil fuel demand.  Including investors who engage in fundamental research to assess future 
performance of effected companies as ESG managed assets is something of a stretch.  This distinction 
is important, however, in assessing the recent proxy voting of very large mutual funds.  See TAN 41-
42 infra.  ESG managed funds are better understood as facilitating value-aligned investors to identify 
appropriate investments regardless of the impact of those values on risk adjusted expected financial 
returns. 
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this essay that while it is relatively easy to achieve value alignment, 
creating social value is far more difficult.  
Socially motivated investors who seek value alignment prefer to 
own stocks only in companies whose business and practices accord with 
the investors’ moral or social values.  Independent of whether their 
investment affects the company’s behavior, these investors wish to 
conform their investment behavior with their social values by owning the 
stock of companies that share them or refusing to own the stock of 
companies that do not.   
Value-aligned investors may be concerned with a firm’s outputs—
its products and services.  For example, they might want to own shares in 
a power company that relies on renewable resources and avoid owning 
shares in a power company that relies on fossil fuel.2  Similar strategies 
might avoid owning shares in companies that manufacture firearms or 
tobacco products.  Or the investors may be concerned with a firm’s 
practices—the way it produces its outputs.  They might want to own shares 
in companies with high ESG standards, and eschew companies with poor 
ESG ratings.3 Value-aligned investors must only examine their personal 
values and then learn whether a company’s practices promote or conflict 
with those values. They then would have to assess the cost of value 
alignment by comparing the return on a portfolio with these limitations 
compared to an otherwise comparable unconstrained portfolio.4  
                                                                                                             
2 Of course, individuals have diverse views of what is socially valuable and the appropriate 
tradeoff between different values.  For example, those concerned with protecting coal mining jobs in 
West Virginia to address income inequality may value supporting low income communities through 
support for clean coal more highly than concern over greenhouse gas emissions.  Thus, when we refer 
to social value throughout this article, we mean the particular investor’s values rather than any 
universal principles. 
3 For example, B Analytics Ltd.  publishes ESG ratings (see B ANALYTICS, http://b-
analytics.net/giirs-ratings (last visited March 3, 2018).  Morningstar, Inc.  also publishes Sustainability 
ratings (see Special Report: Morningstar Sustainability Ratings, MORNINGSTAR, (Aug. 24, 2016, 
06:00 AM), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=745467 (last visited March 3, 
2018).  Casey O’Connor & Sarah Labowitz, Putting the “S” in ESG: Measuring Human Rights 
Performance for Investors Stern School of Business, New York University (2017), demonstrates the 
difficulty in identifying a rating system, focusing on the social component of ESG, assessing 12 
existing measurement techniques.  Given the range of factors necessary to construct a rating structure, 
and the fact that different investors will weight ESG different factors differently, it is not surprising 
that that there are many ratings systems.  A recent Department of Labor Study addressed to pension 
funds reviews the literature.  Department of Labor, Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
Investment Tools: A Review of the Current Field (Dec. 2017). 
4 Mutual funds that limit their investment options in this fashion typically will disclose 
the extent to which their fund’s performance diverges from a benchmark that is comparable but is 
unconstrained.  As an extreme example, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, with a portfolio of 
$11 trillion, over the last decade has gradually excluded from its portfolio the stock of companies 
that produce tobacco, nuclear arms, cluster weapons and coal mining and coal-fired generation.  
Over this period, the constrained portfolio has underperformed the unconstrained benchmark on an 
annual basis by 6 basis points (0.06%)   Norges Bank Investment Management, Return and Risk: 
Government Pension Fund Global (2017), available at 
https://www.nbim.no/contentassets/db0b28dc13934aa6a56596d81d47a33a/return-and-risk-2017---
government-pension-fund-global.pdf.  In a fossil fuel industry funded paper, Fischel, Fiore & 
Kendall, Fossil Fuel Divestment and Public Pension Funds (2017), have estimated that 11 large 
public pension funds annual returns would have been reduced by 15 basis points (0.15%) over the 
previous 50 years were fossil fuel companies excluded from their portfolios.  
Mats Andersson, Patrick Bolton and Frederic Samama, Hedging Climate Risk, 72, Fin. 
Analysis J. 13 (2016), provide a more sophisticated analysis, defining the socially-motivated 
investor’s goal not as divestiture, but instead reducing the total carbon footprint of companies in its 
portfolio.  Using financial engineering techniques, they show that, based on back testing, the carbon 
footprint of an engineered portfolio can be reduced by 40 percent with no tracking error compared to 
 
             
 
4   
Investors who wish to create social value begin with the same 
questions, but then must move on to the more challenging task of 
deploying their capital to increase an investee company’s socially valuable 
outputs—for example, by enabling the company to provide additional 
health care or education to poor people in developing countries.  
Appropriately called “impact investments”, these investments must lower 
the cost of capital to the investee firm compared to the cost available to 
the company in ordinary commercial markets, or otherwise cause it to 
produce more socially valuable outputs or to engage in more socially 
valuable practices—the criteria for creating social value.   
Both investors who seek value alignment and those who seek to 
create social value face the initial question of what financial sacrifice, if 
any, they must accept to achieve their social goals.  When can investors 
achieve these goals – value alignment or value creation – through non-
concessionary investments, from which they expect a full risk-adjusted 
market-rate financial return?5 When must the investments be 
concessionary, sacrificing some financial return for social goals?  
The literature published by asset managers, charitable 
foundations, and related trade associations manifests considerable 
optimism that socially-motivated investors can ensure value alignment 
and, indeed, create social value through non-concessionary investments.  
Some asset managers claim to provide their investors (at least) value 
alignment with no financial concession,6  while others hold out the 
prospect of alpha―value alignment with better than risk-adjusted market 
returns.7  And some asset managers promise their investors the gold ring: 
social value creation without sacrificing financial return8  Similarly, some 
foundations imply that they can create social value through non-
concessionary investments of their endowments and urge their peers to 
follow suit.9  
We are skeptical about many of these claims.  Precisely because 
                                                                                                             
an unconstrained benchmark. The large empirical literature reports mixed results with respect to by 
how much, if at all, the performance of constrained funds fall short of that of an unconstrained index.  
See, e.g., Luc Renneboog, Jenke ter Horst & Chendi Zhang, The Price of Ethics and Stakeholder 
Governance: The Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 302 (2008); 
Allen Ferrell, Hoa Liang & Luc Rennenboog, Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 585 
(2016); Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassan, ESG and Financial Performance: 
Aggregated Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. Sus. Fin. & Inv. 210 (2016). 
5 The judgments of different investors also may differ about what financial returns a 
particular investment is likely to produce.  For our purposes, it is the particular investor’s judgment 
that is relevant. 
6 See, e.g., CALVERT INVESTMENTS, Inc., http://www.calvert.com/ (last visited March 3, 
2018); see Andersson, Bolton & Samama, supra note 4, (discussing the financial engineering 
necessary to construct a portfolio that significantly reduces the portfolio’s carbon footprint relative to 
a benchmark index without meaningful tracking error, that is, without an offsetting increase in risk or 
reduction in return). 
7 E.g., GENERATION INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLP, https://www.generationim.com/ 
(last visited March  3, 2018). 
8
 E.g., SCHULZE GLOBAL INVESTMENTS LIMITED, http://schulzeglobal.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2017); EQUILIBRIUM CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, http://www.eq-cap.com/ (last visited March 3, 
2018) (Equilibrium Capital states that it focuses on “sustainability-driven real assets investment 
strategies” and “drives economic value, portfolio advantage and … alpha returns through scale and 
effective management.”). 
9 E.g., The F.B. HERON FOUNDATION, http://heron.org/ (last visited March 3, 2018).  
See Clara Miller, The World Has Changed and So Must We, available at 
https://www.missioninvestors. org/system/files/tools/the-world-has-changed-and-so-must-we-clara-
miller-f-b-heron-foundation.pdf (last visited March 3, 2018). 
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the socially-motivated market sector is growing so rapidly, participants on 
both the sell-side and the buy-side of the market label their activities in a 
loose fashion that reflects either their aspirations or their marketing 
strategies rather than measurable results.   
The need for clarity and precision in defining a socially-motivated 
asset management strategy is highlighted by the term impact investing.  
The attractions of impact investing are obvious.  Socially-motivated 
investors seek change, and having an impact on the direction and pace of 
change through one’s investments powerfully resonates with that 
aspiration.  Yet this resonance has led to a grab bag of investment 
strategies that all claim the same mantle but with more or less precision 
and more or less evidence of impact.  The core of asset management is 
evaluation and comparison.  Absent a clear framework of the strategy and, 
hence, a well-defined benchmark against which portfolio returns should 
be measured, neither evaluation nor comparison is possible.  Without both, 
the socially-motivated investment market segment will suffer.  
We do not doubt that it is possible with care and skill to achieve 
value alignment with limited financial concessions over time.10  But while 
we disagree with those who define impact investing to include only 
concessionary investments, it is in our view very difficult to create social 
value through one’s investments while nonetheless earning risk-adjusted 
financial returns.  In any event, we believe that the term “impact investor,” 
as its name implies, should be reserved for investors who seek social value 
creation rather than only value alignment.  The social investing field can 
grow responsibly only if individual investors, impact investing trade 
associations, and asset managers are candid with themselves and others 
about the conditions necessary for real impact.11 
In this essay, we first address the problem of imprecise 
terminology that presents a barrier to important issues actually being 
joined.  In particular, we address a range of terms that are commonly and 
confusedly used in the social investing community.  We then present a 
straight forward taxonomy of socially-motivated investments that clearly 
identifies what should count as impact investing and how that framing 
relates to concessionary and non-concessionary investments.   
Such a taxonomy allows investors to articulate their goals and 
asset managers to articulate clearly what they offer and how their 
performance should be measured.  Putting forward a clear taxonomy is 
not, as a commentator on an earlier version of this essay put it, 
“prescriptive.”12  There are many ways to make important contributions, 
but the field badly needs a benchmark against which claims of social value 
creation can be measured.  Specifying that benchmark allows the actual 
debate to begin.   
We next address three big questions in that debate.  First, can 
investments in public companies achieve value alignment or create social 
                                                                                                             
10 See Andersson et. al., supra note 4. 
11 See Brian Trelstadt, Impact Investing: A Brief History, CAP. & SOC’Y, Dec. 15, 2016 
(noting that standard definitions of impact investing are so broad “that it is hard to identify what is an 
impact investment and what is not.”).   
12 See Nancy E. Pfund & Lisa Alexander, Response to “How Investors Can (and Can’t) 
Create Social Value”: “There does not have to be a sacrifice between achieving top-tier financial return 
and possible positive social and environmental impacts.”, STAN. SOC. & INNOV. REV., available at 
https:// ssir.org/articles/entry/how_investors_can_and_cant_create_social_value. 
             
 
6   
value, whether or not with concessions on return?  Second, can 
investments in private companies create social value, again whether or not 
with return concessions?  Third, can socially-motivated investors working 
with other stakeholders cause public companies to create social value? 
 
Our conclusions are as follow.   
 
• Impact investments in public markets.  It is virtually impossible 
for investors to affect the outputs or behavior of firms whose 
securities trade in public markets through buying and selling 
securities in the secondary market.  Socially-motivated investors 
who seek to improve ESG performance or otherwise increase the 
social value produced by a public company must join forces with 
consumers, employees, corporative activists, and regulators to 
affect portfolio company behavior.  The recent success of climate 
change-related proxy proposals at major oil companies illustrate 
the point:13 portfolio strategy alone will not work.  Finally, 
secondary investments in public markets are inevitably non-
concessionary save through the loss of portfolio diversification. 
• Concessionary investments in private markets.  However, it is 
possible for impact investors to affect the outputs of firms in 
private market transactions by accepting financial returns below 
those required by socially-neutral investors. Foundations’ 
program-related investments are paradigmatic of such subsidies.      
• Non-concessionary investments in private markets.  It is also 
possible for impact investors to affect the outputs of private firms 
through non-concessionary investments by taking advantage of 
private knowledge that they or their asset managers possess.  
However, non-concessionary investors’ claims to have private 
information should be taken with a grain of salt.  These investors 
are playing in a highly competitive game against the universe of 
private equity investors whose success depends on developing 
value-relevant private information regardless of the strategy.   
 
 
I.  THE TERMINOLOGY OF FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER 
PROFESSIONAL SOCIALLY-MOTIVATED INVESTORS14 
 
The first step in our analysis addresses the imprecise and 
confusing terminology used by foundations and other professional 
socially-motivated investors, as well as asset managers who seek their 
patronage, that create a barrier to debate and, more important, to 
assessment.  Readers will note that this common terminology often 
overlaps.  Then in Section II we focus on the term impact investment, and 
specify what investments can and cannot create social value.  Section III 
addressed concessionary and non-concessionary investments. This 
precision permits investors to articulate their goals with precision and 
                                                                                                             
             13 See TAN 42-43 infra. 
                 14 See MISSION INVESTORS EXCHANGE, Inc., https://www.missioninvestors.org/mission-
investing (last visited March 3, 2018). 
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allows asset managers to articulate clearly what they offer and, most 
important, how their performance should be measured. 
 
A. Unpacking Common Terminology 
 
Impact Investments are socially-motivated investments made for 
the purpose of increasing or improving the socially-valuable outputs and 
practices of investee enterprises: for example, manufacturing anti-malaria 
bed netting or reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  In our terms, these 
investments seek to create social value.  Impact investments can be made 
by all types of investors: foundations, family offices, endowments, funds, 
and individuals.  As we discuss in Section II, social value is created only 
by increasing the amount of an investee company’s socially beneficial 
outputs or their quality rather than just aligning the investors’ portfolio 
decisions with their social values.  This necessary causal link between the 
investment and an increase in socially desirable outputs is commonly 
blurred in the social investment community.15   
Impact investments may be concessionary or non-concessionary.  
Some investment funds, such as Equilibrium Capital, claim to create social 
value and also claim to be non-concessionary and to target market 
returns.16  Others, such as Acumen Fund,17 expect to earn less than market 
returns as the price of creating social value.  And some, such as Bridges 
Ventures UK and Omidyar Network,18 consider both types of investments, 
thereby holding out the potential of non-concessionary returns.  The 
significance of this distinction is discussed in Section III. 
Mission, or mission-related, investments (MRIs) refer to 
investments made by a foundation in pursuit of its charitable mission.  
They fall into two categories: 
 
• Non-concessionary mission investments have the primary purpose 
of generating financial returns to fund the socially-motivated 
investor’s programmatic efforts and that are made in companies 
whose outputs or practices are consistent with the foundation’s 
mission.19  Non-concessionary mission investments seek at least 
value alignment but with market-rate risk adjusted returns.   
                                                                                                             
15 The confusion over what is included in impact investment category may reflect the 
apparent absence of attention in the academic community.  Robert Robb and Martine Satell report that 
based on all issues of six “top” economics and finance journals (AM. ECON. REV., ECONOMETRICA, J. 
FIN., J. ECON. Lit., J. POL.  ECON., Quarterly J. ECON.) available on JSTOR, not a single article uses 
the term “impact investing.”  Robert Robb & Martine Satell, Socially Responsible/Impact Investing: 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, CAP. & SOC’Y, Dec. 15, 2016.  Morgan Stanley & Co., for example, 
provides a good example of why precision is needed:  Its overall ESG platform is titled “Investing 
with Impact: Creating Economic, Social and Environmental Value.” When one drills down a little 
deeper, only private market investments are held out as having the potential to create value.  This 
casual usage of the term impact investment can at best confuse investors and at worst mislead them.  
See MORGAN STANLEY & co., supra note 2.   
16 See note 7, supra.   
17 See ACUMEN FUND INC., http://www.acumen.org/ (last visited March 3, 2018). 
18 See BRIDGES FUND MANAGEMENT, Ltd., http://www.bridgesventures.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2017); OMIDYAR NETWORK, LLC, http://www.omidyar.com/ (last visited March 3, 2018). 
19 Under a 2015 interpretation of IRC § 4944, Investments Made for Charitable Purposes, 
the IRS advised that “under the regulations, an investment made by a private foundation will  not be 
considered to be a  jeopardizing investment [and so subject to excise tax] if, in making the investment, 
the foundation managers exercise  ordinary business care and prudence (under the circumstances 
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• Concessionary mission investments are typically made as 
program-related investments (PRIs).  This category is a construct 
of the U.S.  Internal Revenue Code, which requires that PRIs’ 
primary purpose be to further the foundation’s charitable purposes 
rather than only to secure financial returns even if the returns will 
be used to further the charitable purpose.  For example, it is highly 
unlikely that a foundation would invest in the public bond market 
though it might well use a PRI to finance a social impact bond that 
addressed one of the foundation’s charitable purposes.20  Like 
grants, PRIs count toward a foundation’s required annual mission-
related payout of five percent of its endowment.  And like grants, 
PRIs seek to create social value, that is, to increase or improve the 
investee’s socially-valuable outputs. 
 
Socially-responsible investments are investments whose primary 
purpose is to generate financial returns that are consistent with certain 
values―what we have called value alignment investing.  These include, 
for example, investments in companies that engage in good ESG practices 
that may be independent of a foundation’s particular mission.  For 
example, a foundation whose charitable purpose is not environmental, or 
a university, may still prefer not to hold stock in fossil fuel companies, 
hence the familiar targeting of universities in divestiture campaigns.  Thus, 
socially responsible investing also includes divesting from, or not 
investing in, companies whose outputs (e.g., alcohol, tobacco, firearms or 
                                                                                                             
prevailing at the time the investment is made) in providing for the long-term and short-term financial 
needs of the foundation to carry out its charitable purposes.”  See IRS Notice 2015-62 I.R.B. 411.   
    Outside the tax area, the DELAWARE UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF 
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, Del.Code Ann. tit 12, §§ 4701 (2007), from which most U.S. nonprofits 
derive their guidance, takes much the same position as the IRS.  Delaware explicitly requires that 
persons making investment decisions on behalf of an institution consider the institution’s charitable 
purpose, characterizing this as a “fundamental duty.”  Under standard features of Delaware corporate 
law, this would require the board to consider whether the foundation’s purpose warranted accepting a 
lower financial return in order to achieve a charitable purpose.  That decision would be protected by 
the business judgment rule.  To our knowledge, the Delaware Attorney General has never made an 
allegation of imprudence with respect to Delaware nonprofits’ social impact investments. 
    In contrast, the Labor Department, which administers the Employee Retirement and 
Security Act (“ERISA”), is significantly more restrictive than either the IRS or Delaware.  Plan 
fiduciaries that are subject to ERISA may take ESG considerations into account in making portfolio 
decisions only if doing so does not negatively impact investment returns.  Thus, such pension funds 
may not make concessionary investments: “Under ERISA, the plan trustee or other investing fiduciary 
may not use plan assets to promote social, environmental, or other public policy causes at the expense 
of the financial interests of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries.  Fiduciaries may not accept lower 
expected returns or take on greater risks in order to secure collateral benefits.”   Department of Labor, 
Interpretative Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard under ERISA in Considering Economically 
Targeted Investments, 29 CFR Part 2059 (Oct. 26, 2015).  One would expect, however, that a good 
faith belief by the trustees based on reasonable diligence as to the non-concessionary character of an 
investment would protect them from liability, thus narrowing somewhat the difference between the 
standards. 
20 A social impact bond is a form of pay for performance contract in which a government 
contracts with an expert organization to plan and execute a social project in which the expert is paid 
based on achieving milestones specified in the contract, for example, reducing recidivism among 
released prisoners.  The expert’s efforts are funded through bonds under which payments are made 
only if the project meets its contractually specified milestones.  Foundations do invest in funding such 
bonds.  See generally, Jeffrey Liebman & Alina Sellman, Social Impact Bonds: A Guide for State and 
Local Governments, HAR.  KENNEDY SCH., SOC. IMPACT BOND TECH. ASSISTANCE LAB 7 (2013), 
available at https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/siblab/files/social-impact-bonds-a-guide-for-state-an 
d-local-governments.pdf (last visited March 3, 2018). 
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gambling) or business practices (poor treatment of employees or 
environmental degradation) conflict with the investor’s values.   
Most socially responsible investments take place in public 
markets, for example through public mutual funds that impose a screen on 
their portfolios to exclude companies whose activities are antithetical to 
the values of many socially-motivated investors.  These funds hold 
themselves out to investors as being capable of earning non-concessionary 
returns—they are expected to earn at least risk-adjusted market returns.   
 
II.  IMPACT AS A REQUISITE OF SOCIAL VALUE CREATION 
 
To say that a socially-motivated investment creates social value 
is to say that the investment produces a social impact—that is, an outcome 
that would not occur but for the investment.  In the language of evaluation, 
what would happen without the investment is called the counterfactual.  
For an investment to actually have social impact, it must meet two 
conditions: 
 
• Enterprise impact.  The investee company must produce the 
investor’s intended social outcomes; and 
• Investment impact, additionality, or social value-added.  The 
investment must increase the production of those outcomes.21 
 
To illustrate enterprise impact, suppose that a socially motivated 
investor invested in a company that provides health care for the poor in a 
developing country.  Enterprise impact requires that firm-related health 
care professionals are in fact serving the poor (or will when its strategy is 
implemented) and, as a result, that their clients have (or will have) better 
health outcomes.  As with any investment, the outcome can only be 
predicted when the investment is made.  Here the measure is ex post: were 
the expectations met?22   
 
The matter of investment impact, or as we’ll call it henceforth, 
social value added, is unique to impact investing.  For an investment to 
meet the condition of social value added, it must increase the amount or 
quality of the investee company’s socially valuable outputs or practices 
compared to what they would be with only socially-neutral investments.  
As we will explain below, an investor who believes that mobile telephony 
has tremendous social and economic benefits might have social impact by 
                                                                                                             
21 In some cases, for example, greenhouse gas production—the desired output change is 
negative.  While the problem can be solved rhetorically, say by framing the goal as increasing the 
production of carbon neutral product, in the interests of presentation we will ignore the distinction 
except when it has substantive consequences. 
22 The challenges of assessing the social impact of for-profit enterprises are not conceptually different 
from assessing the impact of nonprofit organizations generally—the subject of much writing and good 
work in recent years.  See, e.g., PAUL J. GERTLER, SEBASTIAN MARTINEZ, PATRICK PREMAND & 
LAURA B.  RAWLINGS, IMPACT EVALUATION IN PRACTICE (2d. ed. 2016), available at 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTHDOFFICE/Resources/5485726-1295455628620/Impact_E 
valuation_in_Practice.pdf; ABHIJIT V.  BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL 
RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY (2011).  There is less consensus on how those 
outcomes should (or can) be measured.  We will not address this problem here other than to note the 
necessity that disciplined measurement be undertaken.   
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investing in a risky mobile telephone startup in a developing country or in 
the rural U.S., but cannot have impact by buying AT&T or Verizon stock 
on the New York Stock Exchange.  In the former case, the investor may 
provide essential capital that the start-up cannot get elsewhere or on the 
same favorable terms; in the latter case, the investment will not result in 
additional mobile phone access for even a single customer. 
An investment can affect a business’s operations in two 
fundamental ways: through (1) financial impact, or (2) signaling 
mechanisms.   
 
• Financial Impact: Assume the investor believes that the company 
has opportunities to increase its production of social value. An 
investment results in expected financial impact if it provides more 
capital, or capital at lower cost, than the enterprise could otherwise 
secure from socially-neutral investors.23 Under these 
circumstances, the investment meets the criterion for creating 
social value.24 Conversely, an investor’s divesting its holdings in 
a company would have financial impact only if it deprived a 
wicked enterprise (that is, one that generates negative welfare 
consequences to the public at large) of needed capital that it cannot 
replace at an equivalent cost.  If the capital can be replaced at the 
same cost, then the divestment may create value alignment but 
does not create social value other than possibly through signaling 
impact.  As we will see, divesting stock in a publicly traded 
company will not directly deprive a wicked enterprise of capital.   
 
Just as do socially-neutral private equity and venture capital firms, 
some social impact investors also provide non-monetary 
assistance, such as improving management and governance, 
fundraising, and networking.  Because such assistance is almost 
always ancillary to providing financial impact, we will include it 
in this category rather than create a new one.25 
• Signaling Impact: A socially-motivated investment decision may 
indirectly affect an enterprise’s cost of capital by signaling 
approval or disapproval of the enterprise to consumers, 
employees, regulators, or other stakeholders, thereby affecting 
                                                                                                             
  23 Paul Brest & Kelly Born, When Can Impact Investing Create Real Impact? STAN. SOC. 
& INNOV. REV., (2013), http://ssir.org/up_for_debate/article/impact_investing (last visited March 3, 
2018). 
24 See, e.g., Bridges Fund Management, LLP, Bridges Impact Report - a Spotlight on our 
Methodology (2013), http://www.bridgesfundmanagement.com/publications/bridges-impact-report-
2013-spotlight-meth odology/ (last visited March 3, 2018); Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 
Measuring Impact, (Sep. 2014), http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org/reports/Measuring Impact 
WG paper FINAL.pdf(last visited March 3, 2018).   
25 Investments are occasionally designed to improve an entire sector.  This is the rationale 
for some of Omidyar Network’s investments.  See Matt Bannick & Paula Goldman, Priming the 
Pump: The Case for a Sector Based Approach to Impact Investing, Omidyar Network, LLC (Sep. 
2012), https://www. omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file_archive/insights/PrimingthePump_Omidyar 
Network_Sept_2012.pdf.  Similarly, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation invested in M-KOPA, 
which sells solar panels to consumers on credit, to demonstrate a new financial asset class safe enough 
to qualify for commercial bank financing. See Paul Brest, Investing for Impact with Program-Related 
Investments: A Report on Strategic Investing at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, STAN. SOC. 
& INNOV. REV.  (2016), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/investing_for_impact_with_program_related_ 
investments (last visited March 3, 2018).    
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stakeholders’ direct interaction with the enterprise through their 
purchasing, employment or regulatory decisions.  The investor 
may also engage in “shareholder activism” by initiating or voting 
proxy resolutions with the goal of affecting the corporation’s 
behavior.    
III.  CONCESSIONARY VS.  NON-CONCESSIONARY INVESTMENTS 
 
As previously defined, a concessionary investment is one with a 
below-market risk-adjusted expected financial return.  The concession is 
the economic equivalent of a donation or grant intended to create social 
value.  Whether an investment by a foundation is non-concessionary or 
concessionary is a question of its expected risk-adjusted return, and not 
whether the funds come from the endowment or program budget, which is 
a matter of internal governance and accounting.26 
Socially-motivated concessionary investments have the potential 
to reduce an enterprise’s cost of capital.  By definition, socially-neutral 
investors will not invest at below-market rates while socially-motivated 
concessionary investors may do exactly that.  The potential upside of a 
concessionary investment is that, by providing capital at below-market 
rates, it will have an impact:  the investee firm can produce more socially 
valuable outputs.  The potential downside is failure—that the subsidy will 
not create social value—but failure is possible with respect to any 
investment whether socially-motivated or not.  As well, the investment 
may merely redound to the benefit of other investors; or worse, the subsidy 
may distort the markets in which the company operates to the ultimate 
detriment of the investors’ intended beneficiaries.27    
Although we have characterized a concessionary investment as 
one that sacrifices risk-adjusted market returns, there are two ways in 
which even a seemingly non-concessionary investment may compromise 
the investor’s financial interests. 
The first focuses on the phrase risk-adjusted returns: a socially-
motivated investment may sacrifice portfolio diversification, thereby 
causing the investor to bear risk for which he will not be compensated.  
We would expect this effect to be most prominent when a socially-
motivated investor divests from an entire sector (e.g., fossil fuels) or 
overweighs a particular sector because of the potential for social gain (e.g., 
renewable energy).28 
                                                                                                             
26 If one were to characterize a grant as an “investment,” as is often done metaphorically, 
it would be an investment with a negative financial return, since a grant entails a total loss of capital. 
27 See Matt Bannick and Paula Goldman, Do No Harm; Subsidies and Impact Investing, 
STAN. SOC. & INNOV. REV., (2012), available at 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/do_no_harm_subsidies_and_impact_investing (last visited March 3, 
2018); Michael Kubzanksy, Why Business Models Matter, Getting to Scale, in GETTING TO SCALE, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS 33 (Laurence Chandy et al. eds., 2013). 
28 To see this, keep in mind that most equity investments yield returns that are positively 
correlated with one another because of common macroeconomic factors affecting nearly all 
investments.  However, these macroeconomic factors typically explain only 40% of the total variation 
in equity returns.  Of the remaining 60% variation, about a third, or 20% of total volatility, is explained 
by factors common to the stock’s industry.  (The industry is typically described by its Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC)).  The final 40% of total volatility is, on average, idiosyncratic to 
specific stocks. 
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If certain stocks (or industries) are perceived to be “mispriced” in 
that they offer greater than risk-adjusted returns, risk-averse investors will 
rationally choose to sacrifice an element of diversification to secure the 
higher returns.  They will overweight (hold more of that security than 
necessary for diversification) the undervalued security (or industry) in 
their portfolio to the point where the greater expected return is offset by 
the greater portfolio risk due to reduced diversification.  The less risk-
averse an investor, the more she is willing to sacrifice diversification to 
achieve the greater than risk-adjusted expected return. 
Similarly, if investment in (or divestment from) certain stocks or 
industries are believed to give rise to increased socially-desirable 
outcomes, then socially-motivated investors will rationally choose to 
sacrifice an element of diversification by overweighting (or 
underweighting) such securities or industries in their portfolios.  They will 
rationally choose to do this up to the point where the socially desirable 
outcomes produced at the margin are offset by the greater portfolio risk 
they bear for doing so.  The greater the value investors place on the social 
benefits their investments produce, the more they should be willing to 
sacrifice diversification to achieve it.29 
           The second way in which financial returns can be compromised by 
socially-motivated investments is through incremental asset management 
costs incurred in pursuing this category of investments.  The due diligence 
efforts of socially-neutral fund managers or investment staff is designed 
solely to enhance financial returns.  By contrast, socially-motivated fund 
managers must conduct due diligence and post-investment interventions 
to enhance social as well as financial performance—resulting in higher 
aggregate evaluation and monitoring costs.30  Such costs may be partially 
outsourced to fund managers and consultants who charge incremental fees 
for assembling socially-screened investment portfolios and incremental 
fees for manufacturing benchmarks against which such portfolios can be 
evaluated for investment performance.  Nonetheless, the fees paid to fund 
managers and consultants is still an increase in costs over those associated 
with pure financial investments.  In addition, the absence of clear measures 
                                                                                                             
These statistics imply that if stocks are correctly priced to reflect their risks, well -
diversified portfolios can eliminate as much as 60% of the risk of holding a single security without 
sacrificing expected returns.  If investors concentrated their bets in a single industry with a portfolio 
of, say, 25 equally-weighted positions, they could eliminate approximately 30% of the risk; that is, 
none of the common industry risk factor would be eliminated and 80% (1 – 1/(25^.5)) of the 40% of 
risk that is idiosyncratic would be eliminated. 
There are interesting efforts to create portfolios that, for example, significantly reduce a 
portfolio’s exposure to a socially negative characteristic, like the portfolio’s carbon footprint, but 
without significant deviation from the performance of an unconstrained benchmark portfolio.  See 
Andersson, Bolton & Samama, supra note 4.   
29 See Andersson, Bolton & Samama, supra note 4.  They argue that a properly constructed 
low carbon index can allow investors to better align their portfolio with their social values with little 
or no sacrifice in diversification benefits.  They also argue that if a sufficient number of investors favor 
such hedged portfolios, the cost of capital of high carbon footprint companies will increase.  While an 
investment in a decarbonized index of stocks may represent an effective strategy for hedging climate 
risk, we are skeptical that such an index can meaningfully affect high carbon footprint companies’ 
cost of capital, as we discuss in the next section. 
30 In a study commissioned by the fossil fuel industry Hendrik Bessembinder examines the 
additional transaction costs associated with creating and maintaining a constrained portfolio – one 
that excludes companies or industries based on ESG criteria. Hendrik Bessembinder, Frictional 
Costs of Fossil Fuel Divestment (2016, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2789878.  
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of social impact causes this second category of due diligence information 
to be comparatively more expensive than due diligence concerning 
financial returns and less informative.  Market demand and regulatory 
mandates have reduced the cost of acquiring financial information and 
produced clear standards for determining what information is necessary.  
Information concerning social value creation remains far behind in both 
the cost of information and in developing shared standards of what to 
measure and how the measurement should be made.31 
To the extent these additional costs are not covered by incremental 
returns, they may result in reduced returns received by socially-motivated 
investors, or be covered by a subsidy provided by the individuals working 
for socially-motivated investors who accept lower compensation than they 
could get elsewhere because of their social commitment.32  Such hidden 
subsidies may make an investment even more concessionary.   
 
IV.  THE FIRST BIG QUESTION: CAN INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC 
MARKETS CREATE SOCIAL VALUE? 
 
 When can investments or divestments in public capital markets 
have impact by affecting the behavior of portfolio companies directly 
through purchasing company securities? The answer is virtually never.  
Because this issue has generated so much discussion within the socially-
motivated investment community, we set out in detail the analysis that 
gives rise to our skepticism that non-concessionary public market 
investments can create social value. 
The paradigmatic public market involves the active trading of 
securities by many buyers and sellers in corporations with multi-billion-
dollar capitalizations on organized stock exchanges.  Now suppose that a 
publicly-traded company produces outputs that are valued by a socially-
motived investor.  These might include, for example, clean energy or drugs 
to cure diseases whose development would not be supported by the 
markets to be served.  Impact investors who value these social goods 
would buy shares of the company if they believed that the purchase would 
cause the company’s share price to increase, thus causing its cost of capital 
to fall.  As a result, the company would be able to finance more projects 
that produced the valued social benefits: the company would need to sell 
fewer shares to raise any given amount of capital; or more capital could be 
                                                                                                             
31 See Michael T. Cappucci, The ESG Integration Paradox (June 8, 2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2983227 (Cappucci, Senior Vice President of 
the Harvard Management Company, stresses the costs associated with integrating ESG characteristics 
in portfolio selection). The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SSAB), founded in 2011, is a 
private sector standards setting board that seeks to set environmentally-related disclosure standards 
for a variety of industries.  The goal is to accomplish for sustainability accounting the same reduction 
indisclosure costs accomplished for financial accounting by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(the FASB).  It is important to recognize the FASB has the far easier job because its goal is to provide 
disclosure that allows assessment of a single goal:  maximizing firm value.  As we stated in note 3, 
ESG assessment requires tradeoffs between multiple goals, about whose priority investors will not 
agree. 
32 See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK, WHAT PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND? HOW TO SUCCEED 
WITHOUT SELLING YOUR SOUL (PRINCETON UNIV. PRESS 2004); Karine Nyborg and Tao Zhang, Is 
Corporate Social Responsibility Associated with Lower Wages, 1-11 (2011), available at  
https://www.econstor .eu/bitstream/10419/47328/1/644897074.pdf (last visited March 3, 2018). 
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raised for any given number of shares issued, thereby financing an 
increased volume of desirable projects. 
But most investors in public markets are socially neutral—hence, 
indifferent to a firm’s social value in the context of their investment 
decision.  Therefore, in public markets, any premium in the valuation of 
shares that results from socially-motivated investors clamoring to own 
them presents an opportunity for socially-neutral bargain-hunters to profit 
from selling shares that are overpriced (from a purely financial 
perspective).  If there existed two companies, alike in all respects except 
that one produces socially-valuable goods and the other does not, any 
increase in the share price of the former will prompt socially-neutral 
investors to sell its shares and buy shares of the latter.  This arbitrage 
process would continue until the stock prices of the two companies were 
identical, thereby eliminating any share price impact based on the socially-
motivated trading, and therefore neutralizing any social value added.  
Indeed, the socially-neutral investors need not own the overpriced shares 
to accomplish this arbitrage.  They could borrow the shares owned by 
others and sell the borrowed shares—the common practice called short-
selling.33 
In any event, purchasing existing shares of stock in a public 
company that produces socially-desirable outcomes is not equivalent to 
purchasing new shares issued by that company.34  One person’s purchase 
of shares is another person’s sale.  Unless the company raises fresh capital 
in the primary markets, the scale of its activities is largely unaffected by 
secondary market transactions. 
Of course, public companies sometimes do return to the primary 
markets to raise capital.  In principle, public firms could advertise for 
subsidized capital in the primary markets to finance socially desirable 
activities.  For example, an electric power company whose stock trades at 
$100 per share could announce that it is seeking investors to purchase 
newly-issued shares at $120 apiece so that the firm could afford to convert 
coal-fired plants to cleaner-burning gas-fired plants without causing 
existing investors to suffer a decline in share price below $100.  If 
investors deemed the social value of improving the environment in this 
way to be worth at least $20 per share and could lock in the company’s 
environmental commitment, they would find such an investment attractive 
even knowing that the share price would fall to $100 in the secondary 
                                                                                                             
33 Of course, there are frictional costs associated with socially-neutral bargain hunters 
engaging in such behavior, so it is possible that if there were enough social impact investors in the 
world, they would, in fact, reduce the cost of capital to the social good-producer and thereby have a 
real impact on the supply of social goods.  But we do not believe that such investors come remotely 
close to comprising a sufficient fraction of the market today to make much if any difference in the 
public markets.  Recent estimates of the value of investment assets of impact investors as a fraction of 
overall public equity market capitalization is less than one-tenth of one percent.  See Lissete Cooper, 
Jeremey Evnine, Jeff Finkelman, Kate Huntington & David Lynch, Social Finance and the 
Postmodern Portfolio: Theory and Practice, J. WEALTH MGMT. 9 (2016).  Note that the estimate 
in footnote note 1 that socially-motivated investment comprise 20 percent of assets under management 
includes all forms of such investment rather than only impact investment.  Because sophisticated 
investors understand that impact investing is possible only in private markets, it is fair to assume that 
the great bulk of socially-motivated investment in public markets is value alignment rather than impact 
investing. 
34 Even some published research makes this mistake.  See, for example, Cooper et al., supra 
note 32. 
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market.  In effect, socially-motivated investors would be making a $20 per 
share grant to the investee company conditioned on the company using the 
grant, in combination with raising non-concessionary capital, to convert 
its plants.35 
We do not recall ever having seen an offering by a public company 
that has this characteristic, but in principle a socially-motivated investor 
could have social impact by investing in a public company’s primary 
issuance of shares on subsidized or “concessionary” terms.36  This 
example provides a natural segue to the more plausible claim that 
opportunities for impact investing—creating social value—are available 
in private markets. 
 
V.  THE SECOND BIG QUESTION:  CAN INVESTMENTS IN PRIVATE 
MARKETS CREATE SOCIAL VALUE? 
 
If purchases of publicly traded stock cannot create social value, 
what about investments in private companies?  For our purposes, the 
critical difference is that in private markets value-relevant information 
about a company is significantly less widely shared, ownership interests 
do not trade freely, and short-selling of overpriced stock is virtually non-
existent.  In private markets, socially-neutral investors therefore cannot 
eliminate through arbitrage the subsidy from socially-motivated investors 
in the same way they can in public markets.  In short, the market for 
investments in privately held companies is likely to be informationally 
inefficient; that is, some investors may have value-relevant private 
knowledge about the company that is not reflected in the trading price at 
which private interests change hands.  This creates an opportunity for 
socially-motivated investors to create social value. 
 
A.  Concessionary investments in private markets 
 
An impact investor who is willing to sacrifice risk-adjusted returns 
sometimes can increase the socially-valuable outputs of an enterprise 
operating in non-public markets because socially-neutral investors would 
not provide capital on the same favorable terms.  Thus, the impact investor 
would make a concessionary investment on such terms if he believed that 
the subsidy (equivalent to the difference between a risk adjusted market 
return and the expected return from the concessionary investment) to the 
investee company would create social value in an amount the investor 
assessed as commensurate with the return concession.  Just as with risk 
clienteles (where more risk-tolerant investors hold larger fractions of their 
portfolios in risky stocks and less risk-tolerant investors hold larger 
                                                                                                             
35 It is may be more straightforward to structure this form of transaction through the 
provision of project finance, which can be cast, in effect, as a commercial version of social impact 
bonds.  See note 18 supra.  This may mitigate the problem of the benefit of socially-motivated 
investments bleeding off to socially-neutral investors.   
36 In several instances, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has made PRIs of this sort to 
induce a small-cap biotech company to develop products for neglected diseases in developing 
countries.  See, e.g., David Bank & Dennis Price, Returns on Investment: How a Broad Bet on a 
Biotech Company Paid Off in Promising Drugs For Neglected Diseases, STAN. SOC. & INNOV. REV., 
(2016), available at https://ssir.org/articles/entry/returns_on_investment (last visited March 3, 2018). 
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fractions of their portfolios in less risky bonds), and tax clienteles (where 
investors facing high tax rates invest larger fractions of their portfolios in 
tax-favored assets and investors facing low tax rates invest a larger fraction 
of their portfolios in tax-disfavored assets), the presence of impact 
investors and impact investment opportunities will give rise to impact 
investment clienteles. 
The dynamic of tax clienteles illustrates how the portfolio 
selection mechanics operate.  Investors must assemble a portfolio of 
investments designed to maximize after-tax risk adjusted returns.  Suppose 
there are two types of riskless assets: taxable bonds issued by companies 
and the federal government, and tax-exempt bonds issued by state and 
local governments.  If these two types of bonds offered equal pre-tax 
returns, taxable investors would prefer to hold the tax-exempt bonds.  
Their demand for tax-exempt bonds would bid up the price of those bonds, 
causing their yield to fall.  The reduced yield on tax-exempt bonds allows 
state and local governments to borrow more cheaply than other borrowers.  
In effect, they are able to collect taxes implicitly through subsidized 
borrowing rates. 
Taxpayers who face a 30% tax on returns from the taxable bond 
would be indifferent between investing in a taxable bond that yields a 5% 
return and a tax-exempt bond that yields 5% x (1 – 30%) or 3.5%.  Tax-
exempt investors (like foundations) would prefer to own the 5% taxable 
bond and none of the tax-exempt bond.  In turn, taxpayers facing tax rates 
above 30% would prefer to own the 3.5% tax-exempt bond and none of 
the taxable bond.  Taxpayers facing different tax rates thus sort themselves 
naturally into tax clienteles.37 
Now consider social impact investment clienteles.  Investors who 
most highly value creating social value will invest in companies where 
their investment will increase the social output of the investee company, 
and will feel appropriately compensated for doing so.  The marginal 
socially-motivated investor will be indifferent between a concessionary 
investment in the social value producing company at a discounted 
expected risk-adjusted financial return accompanied by a social impact 
“bonus,” and investing in a socially neutral investment at a higher risk-
adjusted return but no social impact bonus.  And just as with tax clienteles, 
there will be infra-marginal investors on both sides of indifference.  The 
most socially-minded investors who place the largest value on creating 
social value will get a bargain.  They will receive more financial return 
than they would have required to invest.  And the least socially-minded 
investors will simply not include the social-impact investment in their 
portfolio.38 
                                                                                                             
37 It is useful to note that unless restrictions are placed on the ability to borrow (short-sell) 
one type of bond or the other, a taxpayer facing a tax rate different from 30% could create arbitrage 
profits.  For example, a 40% taxpayer could “print wealth” by borrowing at 5% pretax and 5% x (1 – 
40%) or 3% after tax and investing the proceeds from the loan in tax-exempt bonds yielding 3.5%.  To 
prevent this possibility, tax deductions are disallowed on the interest from borrowing to purchase tax-
exempt bonds.   
38 We note that this calculation is likely to be sloppier than the text assumes because of the 
still primitive means of measuring social value creation.  Harrison Hong & Marcin Kacperczyk, The 
Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on Markets, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 15 (2009), make a useful  effort 
to measure empirically the effects of a socially-motivated clientele on shareholder returns, showing 
that investors in “sin” stocks earn more than risk-adjusted returns.  The outcome was then contested.  
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B.  Non-concessionary investments in private markets  
 
The opportunity to create social value through non-concessionary 
investments also is greater in private than in public markets.  As noted 
above, private markets are less informationally efficient than public 
markets.  An investment officer for a foundation, or the general partner of 
an impact investing private fund, that specializes in a particular sector may 
possess the same kind of special knowledge about, say, enterprises 
delivering health or education services to underserved populations that 
venture capitalists and private equity investors have about the technology, 
social media, and biotech industries.  In both cases, their knowledge and 
expertise, not widely held by others, may enable the fund managers to 
make savvy investments that either are not noticed or mistakenly thought 
to be too risky by other investors.  Just as the conventional venture 
capitalist or private equity investor may have special information about an 
investee company’s financial prospects, the non-concessionary impact 
investor seeks special information about both an investee’s potential social 
impact and its financial prospects.   
However, the non-concessionary impact investor faces 
difficulties, and perhaps even conflicts, not faced by her concessionary 
cousin.  Both investors seek to create social value, which, as we’ve seen, 
requires meeting two criteria: (1) the investee firm itself produces socially 
valuable outputs and (2) the investment reduces the cost of capital to the 
investee firm (compared to investments from socially-neutral investors) 
and thereby can be expected to increase the firm’s socially valuable 
outputs.  But while the concessionary investor is willing to sacrifice 
financial return to meet these criteria, the non-concessionary investor is 
not.  Thus, a third criterion also must be satisfied: (3) the investment must 
be expected to earn a risk-adjusted market-rate return.39  A Venn diagram 
of the choices shows that a non-concessionary impact investor limits itself 
to the area of overlap between market-rate financial returns and increased 
social outputs. 
 
                                                                                                             
David Blitz & Frank J. Fabozzi, Sin Stocks Revisited: Resolving the Sin Stock Anomaly, J. FIN. 
MNGMNT. 1 (fall, 2017), report that the greater than risk-adjusted returns disappear when additional 
factors are added to the asset pricing model.  
39 Note that impact funds that are able to generate risk-adjusted financial outperformance 
(so-called investment “alpha”) but that set market returns as their goal, create capacity to produce 
social impact by investing on both a concessionary and non-concessionary basis.  If they are able to 
identify opportunities that produce social impact and market returns or greater, whereas other investors 
anticipate financial returns that fall below the level that socially-neutral investors would demand, then 
their investment can create social value without sacrificing financial return.  Moreover, they have room 
to make a financial concession equal to some or all of the excess financial return above the market 
return they would otherwise earn, thereby further reducing the investee’s cost of capital and 
magnifying the social impact while still earning market returns or better. 
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To understand the non-concessionary investor’s difficulties in 
seeking to operate in the overlap space, imagine that she is the general 
partner of a fund that promises its limited partners both social impact and 
market-rate returns.  If there are many opportunities that present this 
overlap in the fund’s particular domain, everyone is happy.  But if such 
opportunities are scarce, the general partner will have to compromise one 
or the other goal.  Especially because she and her limited partners will find 
it much easier to measure financial success than the social value created, 
the latter is likely to be sacrificed, intentionally or not.40  
There is a further difficulty with non-concessionary private 
market impact investments.  Assume that the investee firm has the capacity 
to scale its outputs: the more that is invested, the more the enterprise will 
be able to produce socially-valuable outputs and still provide socially 
motivated investors a market return.  The asset manager’s general partner 
who discovered the opportunity can direct investments to the firm in two 
ways: by attracting more investors to her fund, thereby increasing her 
                                                                                                             
40 Bengt Holstrom was awarded the 2016 Nobel Prize in economics in part for the insight 
that the optimal incentive contract for managers depends on the extent to which the manager’s 
principal is able to observe the manager’s effort.  The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Prize 
in Economics 2016, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2016/pop 
ular-economicsciences2016.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).  In particular, Holstrom (with Paul 
Milgrom) showed that when a manager is asked to accomplish two goals but his performance can be 
measured only with respect to one, the second goal, in retrospect not surprisingly, will receive less 
attention.  Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multi-Task Principal – Agent Analyses: Incenitve 
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. Law. Econ. & Org. 24 (1991).  Holmstrom and 
Milgrom’s insight correctly predicts the matter of concern here:  that asset managers with a fund that 
seeks investments from socially motivated investors will choose to be compensated based only on 
financial returns, presumably unwilling to bear the risk of poorly specified, and so relatively 
unobservable, social outcomes.  A recent announcement of a new socially motivated fund by TPG, a 
large private equity firm, in conjunction with Bono, a socially-committed recording star, illustrates the 
point.  While the parties are committed to non-concessionary financial returns, the motivation for the 
$2 billion fund is to create social value.  The fund claims to have its own metrics for measuring the 
social value it creates; however, the asset managers’ compensation will be based only on financial 
performance.  Andrew Ross Sork, Deal Book: A New Fund Seeks Both Financial and Social Returns 
in N.Y. Times (Dec. 16, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/business/dealbook/a-new-fund-
seeks-both-financial-and-soci al-returns.html. Following Holmstrom and Milgrom, compensation 
based only on financial measures can be expected to further bias such managers toward financial 
returns and away from creating social value.  We also note that the potential for a conflict between a 
general partner’s financial incentives and the fund’s investors desire to create social value, can also 
arise as the fund needs to secure liquidity as it approaches the end of its term (typically 10 years).  
Here the concern would be that the general partner would then influence portfolio companies to 
sacrifice social value creation in order to secure liquidity.  See Jacob Gray, Nick Ashburn, Harvey 
Douglas, Jessica Jeffers, David K.  Musto & Christopher Geczy, Great Expectations: Mission 
Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact Investing,  PENN. Wharton SOC. Impact Initiative 
(2015), https://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-Expectations-
Mission-Preservation-and-Financial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf (last visited March 3, 
2018). 
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investable funds; or by spreading the word about the investment to other 
investors, including competing funds.  Foundations making (inevitably 
concessionary) PRIs are often happy to get the word out with the hope of 
sharing the burden.  But unless our general partner needs co-founders 
beyond her budget to make the investment viable, she will typically  
reserve the opportunities for her own limited partners, thereby restricting 
social value creation.   
 
VI.  THE THIRD BIG QUESTION: CAN THE POWER OF CONSUMERS, 
EMPLOYEES, CORPORATE ACTIVISTS, AND REGULATORS 
FACILITATE SOCIAL VALUE CREATION? 
 
This essay focuses on the power of investors to achieve social 
impact through the financial leverage created by their investments.  Other 
stakeholders, however, also can exert leverage, and sometimes more 
effectively.  When one investor sells his stock in a publicly-traded 
company, tautologically another investor takes his place.  In contrast, each 
consumer who refuses to purchase apparel made under poor labor 
conditions detracts incrementally from the seller’s bottom line.  A 
company that treats its workers poorly may not be able to recruit valuable 
employees.  And a company that despoils the environment may be 
scrutinized by regulators who have immense power over its practices.  
From the perspective of these stakeholders, social performance and 
financial performance do not need double bottom line accounting– 
separate measures of the net financial and net social value created.  The 
two are complementary. 
Consumers are particularly influential when they act in concert as 
part of an organized movement intended to affect a firm economically or 
to influence regulators.  Investors can contribute to such a movement both 
symbolically and, perhaps, by instilling in corporate managers a degree of 
fear of unanticipated consequences.  Although divestment seldom has 
direct economic consequences to the portfolio company, the signaling 
effect of divestment by a high-profile investor may provide publicity and 
support for potentially more effective stakeholder efforts, including ESG-
type proxy proposals. 
The potential for an investment decision to contribute to an effort 
to influence firm behavior is highly dependent on the specific context.  At 
one extreme, a silent investment/divestment decision not noticed by other 
stakeholders will have no influence, since investment decisions can have 
signaling power only if they are known.  At the other extreme is a highly-
publicized decision made as part of a concerted boycott movement by a 
respected investor, for example, the Rockefeller Family Charity’s recent 
decision to divest fossil fuel investments, including those started by John 
D.  Rockefeller.41  
                                                                                                             
41Rupert Neate, Rockefeller Family Charity to withdraw all investments fossil fuel 
companies, The GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2016 05:39 PM) 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/ mar/23/rockefeller-fund-divestment-fossil-fuel-
companies-oil-coal-climate-change.   
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The 1990s movement to divest from companies doing business 
with South Africa and the current movement to divest from companies 
extracting fossil fuels or that manufacture firearms are examples of 
divestment playing a role in broad social movements to influence the 
behavior of its targets.  The strategies are essentially political; the more 
stakeholders who express disapproval of the behavior, the more effective 
the effort.   
An empirical study of the South Africa divestment movement 
suggests that divestment had little if any effect on the capital markets, 
though it may have contributed to publicizing the moral issues.42  It is too 
early to assess the effects of the current movement targeting fossil fuels or 
firearm companies.  As of this writing in early 2018, the coal industry is 
economically distressed and the oil industry is also faring poorly.  But 
other factors, such as the advent of plentiful natural gas through fracking, 
improvements in solar and wind energy in part through government 
subsidies, and government regulations, such as renewable energy portfolio 
standards, may fully account for the situation.  Few doubt that changes in 
consumer behavior, such as increased use of public transportation and 
electric and energy-efficient automobiles, as well as regulatory changes, 
such as carbon tax, could significantly reduce CO2 emissions.  Similarly, 
the growing public response to firearms production following the 
Parkland, Florida school shooting may influence legislators and regulators 
to impose more effective limits on their manufacture or sale.43  Divestment 
may serve as a rallying point for such other actions, but as we have argued 
in this essay, the sale of publicly traded stock alone will have little direct 
economic consequences.   
In one critical respect, however, socially-motivated investors may 
have the ability to influence portfolio company decisions by facilitating 
consumer boycotts.  There is evidence that consumer boycotts can 
influence company behavior, and that an important part of the success 
results from company-perceived reputational damage rather than only 
from the boycott’s immediate financial impact.44  A high profile impact 
                                                                                                             
42 Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch & C.  Paul Wazzan, The Effect of Socially Activist 
Investments Policies on Financial Markets: Evidence from the South Africa Boycott, 72 J. Bus. 35 
(1999), concludes: “In all, the evidence from both individual and legislative actions, taken together, 
suggests that the South African boycott had little valuation effect on the financial sector.  Despite the 
prominence and publicity of the boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, the financial 
markets’ valuations of targeted companies or even the South African financial markets themselves 
were not visibly affected.  The sanctions may have been effective in raising the public moral standards 
or public awareness of South African repression, but it appears that financial markets managed to 
avoid the brunt of the sanctions.  This may be an important point for future activists who are 
considering using the tools of the boycott for other causes.” Cf. Bernard Feigenbaum & Anton 
Lowenberg, South African Divestment: Causes and Effects, 6 Contemporary POL’Y Issues, 105 (1988), 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00550.x /pdf (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2017). 
43  See, e.g., Michael Scherer, Florida Gov. Rick Scott breaks with NRA to sign new gun 
regulation, Wash. Post, March 3, 2018, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/florida-gov-rick-scott-breaks-with-nra-to-sign-new-
gun-regulation/2018/03/09/e5d1f02e-23b2-11e8-86f6-
54bfff693d2b_story.html?utm_term=.1efe1b65f2df 
44 For example, Mary Hunter McDonnell and Braydon King report that a significant 
number of large companies that were the subject of a consumer boycott made changes in response, 
even when the boycott did not significantly reduce company revenues.  Mary Hunter McDonnell & 
Braydon King, Keeping Appearances: Reputational Threat and Impression Management, 58 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 367 (2013).  Of course, in consumer markets, reputation is tied closely to financial results.  
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investor with a stake in a boycotted company may be able to leverage the 
combination of its image and its financial investment to facilitate 
consumers’ effort to influence the targeted company through withholding 
patronage. 
 
ESG Criteria as Proxies for Financial Value.  Concern over ESG 
criteria may influence companies through a channel different than actions 
taken by socially-motivated investors.  With respect to fossil fuel 
production, large institutional investors and especially large mutual funds 
(including index funds) recently have become much more likely to vote in 
favor of shareholder environmental proxy proposals that would require 
fossil fuel companies to become more transparent concerning the 
relationship between climate change and their business strategy.  These 
explicitly socially-neutral investors now seem more willing to support 
proxy proposals that are based on a link between ESG-factors and portfolio 
firm profitability. 
A proxy proposal made to Occidental Petroleum in May 2017 is a 
useful example.  The non-binding proposal asked that Occidental issue an 
annual report assessing the impact of long-term climate change on its 
business, including environmentally-based scenario planning.  This was 
the first shareholder proposal of this type that commanded a majority vote 
at a major U.S.  oil company.  Equally telling, it was the first time that 
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, voted for a shareholder 
environmental proposal that management opposed.45  The Occidental 
proxy contest then was followed by shareholder approval of a similar 
proposal at Exxon Mobil.46 
Critical to this approach, for both environmentalist activists and 
asset managers, is that the Occidental and Exxon Mobil proposals and 
asset managers’ voting principles,47 are keyed to improving the targeted 
companies’ financial performance.  As discussed earlier,48 recent Labor 
Department’s statements concerning ERISA compliance allows a pension 
plan fiduciary to take into account environmental concerns in its asset 
management as long as the decisions, whether with respect to an 
                                                                                                             
McDonnel and King argue that their data shows a company response in excess of what the observed 
immediate financial results of the boycott would explain. 
45 Erin Ailworth, Occidental Shareholders Vote for Climate Proposal, N.Y. Times, (May 
12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/occidental-shareholders-vote-for-climate-proposal-
1494616669.  BlackRock’s explanation for its Exxon Mobil vote is contained in its announcement that 
it had voted in favor of the shareholder proposal. announcement, available at, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-cn/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-exxon-
may2017.pdf (last visited March 3, 2018).   
46 See Lyuba Goltser & Kaitlan Descovich, Investor Support Heating up for Climate 
Change Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. on CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (July 3, 2017), available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/03/investor-support-heating-up-for-climate-changeproposal 
s/.  Prior to this vote, BlackRock, as well as Vanguard and Fidelity, routinely voted against 
environmental proposals of any character that were opposed by management.  Id. 
47 For example, BlackRock’s proxy voting guidelines voting principles can be found at 
BlackRock, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities (Feb. 2015) 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-br/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guideli 
nes-us.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).  Vanguard’s (another very large mutual fund company) voting 
guidelines are available at https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/voting-guidelines/, 
and those of State Street available at https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-
governance/ 2017/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement -Guidelines-US-20170320.pdf (last visited March 
3, 2018). 
48 See note 17 supra.  
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investment decision or in voting pension fund securities, are not 
concessionary—that is, they do not reduce the expected risk adjusted 
return to the fund.  Thus, proposals are framed in terms of the positive 
effect on a company’s financial performance of greater attention to the 
business consequences of climate change. 
A different group of shareholders – large index-based mutual 
funds – have taken a different approach from activist sponsored proxy 
contests to influence portfolio company behavior. Because investors 
have shifted very large amounts of assets from actively managed equity 
mutual funds to equity index funds, and because of the concentration of 
index funds with the three largest funds – BlackRock, Vanguard and 
State Street make up some 90 percent of total index fund investment –  
these funds are quantitatively important shareholders.49  Taken together, 
the three are the largest shareholders in 88 percent of S&P 500 
companies.50 In January 2017, Blackstone’s CEO Larry Fink sent a letter 
to the CEOs of its portfolio companies stating BlackRock’s basis for 
assessing company management: “To prosper over time, every company 
must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes 
a positive contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their 
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the 
communities in which they operate.”51  Because BlackRock cannot sell 
shares in index funds if they believe portfolio company strategies are ill-
advised, the company intends to have continual “engagement” with their 
management to influence company decisions.   
This strategy took concrete form following the 2018 Florida 
school shooting.  BlackRock, the largest shareholder in the three largest 
U.S. firearms manufacturers, urged firearms manufacturers to assess 
their business strategies concerning distribution of their productss and 
noting that it might vote against directors of companies who did not 
appropriately respond.  It also announced that it intended to offer an 
index product that excluded firearms manufacturers.52   
            Outside the proxy proposal context, proponents of ESG factors as 
a measure of investment desirability take the argument that socially 
responsible behavior leads to better company performance one step 
further.  Rather than seeking to improve the quality and availability of 
                                                                                                             
49 See Ronald J. Gilson  Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Col. L. Rev. 883 (2013)(tracing 
the intermediation of equity). 
50 Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big 
Three: Passive Index Funds, the Re-concentration of Equity and the New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & 
POLITICS 298 (2017). 
51 Larry Fink letter to Portfolio Company CEOs, available at 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-gb/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter. 
52 BlackRock, Press Release, BlackRock’s Approach to Companies that Manufacture and Distribute 
Civilian Firearms, March 2, 2018, available at 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/newsroom/press-releases/article/corporate-one/press-
releases/blackrock-approach-to-companies-manufacturing-distributing-firearms.  In its release, 
BlackRock was careful to stress the potential cost to companies from the public response to misuse 
of their products, as with the oil company proxy contests voicing a business rather than a social 
concern.  The gun manufacturers response  highlighted the awkward application of fiduciary duties 
in these circumstances.  American Outdoor Brands, which manufactured the weapon used in the 
Florida attack, responded to BlackRock’s March 2nd letter by staying closely to its existing strategy: 
“We believe that our stockholders are well aware of the products we manufacture and fully 
understand the risks associated with investing in a firearms manufacturer.” 
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information assessing the impact of environmental factors on a company’s 
long term performance, proponents argue that high ESG ratings have a 
direct impact on profitability.53  As discussed above, proponents of fossil 
fuel divestiture argue that current stock prices do not reflect the impact of 
future environmental regulation on the ownership value of “stranded 
assets” ―coal, oil, or gas.54   
           The argument, while superficially attractive, is implausible.  
Information concerning stranded assets is publicly available, and 
proponents offer no explanation for why this risk is not already reflected 
in existing stock prices through the actions of socially neutral analysts and 
investors.  From this perspective, ESG factors and reliance on fossil fuels 
reflect a familiar part of standard fundamental analysis.  Absent a better 
argument, there is no reason to believe that equity analysts are 
systematically less able to assess the valuation implications of these 
factors than of non-ESG factors.55 
Other studies have posed similar hypotheses.  Suppose a 
company’s social capital, including the trust stakeholders have in the 
company, allow the company to contract more effectively with its 
stakeholders, including labor and capital market participants, over items 
that are not otherwise observable or verifiable.  Then a company’s ESG 
ratings may provide a credible signal of the company’s less observable 
social capital.56  It would follow that better ESG ratings could lead to a 
company having greater social capital and so higher productivity.57   
Again, however, the same problem appears.  If ESG ratings and 
investments in ESG affect productivity, then they should already be 
reflected in companies’ stock prices; companies then will have selected 
and invested in achieving the efficient level of ESG rating. Shareholder 
                                                                                                             
53 See, e.g., Sustainability Metrics: ESG Actions Make for Profitable Business, ESG 
ADEC-INNOVATIONS (May 28, 2013, 5:50 AM), http://info.firstcarbonsolutions.com/blog 
/bid/293787/Sustainability-Metrics-ESG-Actions-Make-for-Profitable-Business. 
54 See, e.g., Karel Beckman, An Investor Speaks: The Oil Party Is Almost Over (Feb. 21, 
2014), available at Energy Post, http://www.energypost.eu/investor-speaks-oil-party-almost/. 
55 Henri Sevaes & Ane Tamayo, The Role of Social Capital: A Review, OXF. REV. of ECON. 
POL’Y, (forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933393 (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).  
(“[W]e believe that if prices do not fully reflect the fundamentals of a company and this information 
is readily available, there is sufficient arbitrage capital available to correct any mispricing.”).   
56 The importance of social capital or trust in contracting with stakeholders is developed in 
Steven Blader Claudette Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson & Andrea Platt, The Real Effects of 
Relational Contracting, 105 AM. ECON REV. 452 (2015). 
57 Id.  In this vein, Amiraslani, Lins, Servaes and Tamayo recently sought to test empirically 
the link between a company’s trustworthiness and its access to the bond market, where bond market 
access was measured by secondary market bond spreads and trustworthiness was measured by ESG 
activities.  Over the period 2005 through 2013, the authors find that, on average, there is no relation 
between corporate bond spreads and ESG investment.  Trust, as measured by ESG, does not signal 
that an issuer is less likely to take advantage of its bondholders.   
The results are strikingly different between August 2008 through March 2009, when the 
literature finds that the financial crisis caused a shock to information concerning companies’ 
trustworthiness.  The authors report that their “results are unambiguous: during the [financial] crisis 
of trust, secondary market spreads of high [ESG] firms did not rise as much as the spreads of low-
[ESG] firms.”   They “conclude that corporate social capital [as measured by ESG] affects bond 
contracting when it matters the most: when there is a crisis of trust and bondholders seek reassurance 
that they will not be expropriated.”  Hani Amiraslani, Karl V. Lins, Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, 
The Bond Market Benefits of Corporate Social Capital, ECGI Finance Working Paper N. 535/2017, 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978794. 
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efforts to change those levels will at best do no good, and at worst cause 
the adoption of inefficient practices.58  
We have little doubt that a company’s performance on some ESG 
factors may be relevant to assessing its long-term profitability.  But in 
addition to the likelihood that this information is already reflected in 
market price, the breadth and vagueness of the factors as a whole, and the 
likelihood that different factors bear on different investments, present 
barriers to their widespread use as investment guides.59  
Borrowing from standard setting in U.S. accounting by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board presses for standardized disclosure of ESG factors that 
are material to investment decisions.60  We strongly support encouraging 
companies to disclose ESG practices and other characteristics that will 
assist investors in more accurately assessing the value of companies’ 
investments, as well as provide information to stakeholders who wish to 
pursue consumer or politically directed strategies.  If done well, it will 
reduce the cost of acquiring that information by centralizing its production 
through requiring company disclosure, the entity that has the least 
expensive access to the information.61 However, it seems highly unlikely 
that socially-motivated, or even socially-neutral, investors can 
systematically profit from identifying mispriced securities based on such 
information. 
VII.  CONCLUSION—AND ADVICE TO INVESTORS 
 
The thrust of this essay is as follows. 
 
• Value-alignment.  Socially-motivated investors who only wish to 
align their portfolios with their values must determine whether a 
potential investee company’s outputs and practices are so aligned; 
and whether concentrated holdings in or divestment from a 
particular sector will increase investors’ portfolio risk by reducing 
diversification.  If portfolio risk is increased, then the socially-
motivated investor must decide whether they wish to pay the price 
of value-alignment.  We do not denigrate value alignment.  But 
                                                                                                             
58 We note that these hypotheses take a form similar to Jeremy Stein’s early modelling of 
a process that could explain managerial short-termism by reference to the difficulty in signaling 
otherwise asymmetric information.  Jeremy Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. 
POL. ECON. 61 (1988).  Stein argued that managers may favor short-term investment strategies because 
the market has less information than managers concerning longer term returns.  While Stein’s 
argument is purely informational, ESG proponents argue that better ESG practices directly lead to 
better performance, not just to reducing the information asymmetry between the market and managers.     
59 We note, however, that the subjectivity of the various ESG indices has not stopped some 
investors from adopting such indices as the performance benchmarks for their investment portfolio.  
For example, quite recently Swiss Re, a large European insurance company, is moving its entire $130 
billion to an ESG benchmark, using the MSCI ESQ index.  Swiss Re Shifts Entire $130 Billion 
Portfolio to Ethical Indices by Oliver Ralph, FT (July 6, 2017), http://www.ft.com/content/d58d1910-
61ab-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1? segmentId=a7371401-027d-d8bf-8a7f.  If one is of a skeptical mind, 
one might speculate that a benchmark is not an investment strategy.  
60 See, e.g., SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (SASB) http://www.sasb. 
org/ (last visited March 3, 2018).  Materiality also lies at the core of the investment strategies of 
Generation Investment Management LLP, an investment fund founded by David Blood and Al Gore.  
See GENERATION INVESTMENT LLP, https://www.generationim.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
61 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV.  549 (1984). 
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we think it is extremely important not to confuse it with social 
value creation.   
• Social value creation.  As the term “impact” suggests, impact 
investors are the subset of socially-motivated investors who wish 
to go beyond value alignment to create social value by using their 
investment decisions to influence a portfolio company’s 
performance.  For an affirmative investment, this requires that: 
 
o The investee company’s outputs or practices must have 
social value beyond the private value created between 
firms and the parties with whom they contract directly. 
o The investment either must 1) lower the cost of capital to 
the company compared to ordinary commercial markets, 
thereby allowing it to produce more socially valuable 
outputs or to engage in more socially valuable practices—
the criteria for creating social value; or 2) allow the 
investor to provide expertise that the portfolio company 
does not have, with the same effect. 
 
• Public markets.  It is virtually impossible for a socially-motivated 
investor to affect the outputs or behavior of companies whose 
securities trade in public markets through buying and selling their 
shares in the secondary market.  Socially-motivated investors who 
seek to affect public companies’ ESG practices must join forces 
with consumers, employees, corporative activists, and regulators.  
As we have seen, ESG-based proposals are gaining institutional 
investor support where the proposals are explicitly tied to 
company financial performance. 
• Concessionary investments in private markets.  However, it is 
possible for concessionary impact investors to affect the outputs 
of portfolio firms through private market transactions by 
providing subsidies in the form of accepting financial returns 
below the level that socially-neutral investors would require, and 
so providing subsidies. Foundations’ program-related investments 
are paradigmatic of such subsidies.  The difficulties of 
concessionary impact investments lie in targeting the subsidy so 
as to benefit one’s intended beneficiaries rather than other 
investors, or the company’s asset managers, through the absence 
of accountability for whether and how much social value was 
created, and in not adversely distorting the markets in which the 
firm operates.   
• Non-concessionary investments in private markets.  It is also 
possible for non-concessionary impact investors to affect the 
outputs of firms while still earning a risk-adjusted market return 
through private market transactions by taking advantage of private 
knowledge or special expertise that they or their fund managers 
possess.  However, non-concessionary investors’ claims to have 
value-relevant private information should be viewed with healthy 
skepticism.  These investors are playing in a highly competitive 
game with the universe of private equity investors whose success 
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depends on developing such private information.  The ultimate 
test of a non-concessionary impact investment is whether 1) the 
risk adjusted financial returns match the market, a familiar 
assessment for which there are accepted measurement techniques, 
and 2) how much social value is created, for which there is still 
little consensus on the difficult question of how value creation 
should be measured.  The differential measurability of financial 
value created and social value created has resulted in asset 
managers running impact investing funds being paid based 
(almost) exclusively on financial value.  If the managers’ success 
in creating social value can not be measured, neither can that of 
the investors providing the capital. 
 
We disagree with those who define impact investing to include only 
concessionary, or only non-concessionary, investments.  Under the right 
circumstances, both kinds of investments can create social value.  But the 
field can only grow responsibly if individual investors, impact investing 
trade associations, foundation officers and asset managers are candid with 
themselves and others about the conditions necessary for social value to 
be created and rigorous with respect to how it, and hence their 
performance, should be measured. 
And this leads us to offer some advice for the large majority of 
individual impact investors who do not make direct investments but place 
their confidence in the general partners of so-called impact funds. 
 
• First, it is difficult, though not impossible, for a fund to create 
social value – as opposed to achieve value alignment—while also 
promising to deliver market-rate financial returns or better.  Funds 
that promise both deserve special scrutiny and a clear 
understanding of how both elements of fund performance will be 
measured.   
• Second, if the fund is serious about impact, it should report on 
social value created as well as financial returns, including an 
estimate of that value creation and a clear description of how it 
was calculated.  A strong signal that the general partner is 
committed to social impact as well as to financial returns would 
be that her compensation is based on the social value created as 
well as on financial returns.  We note that doing so is difficult 
because vague measurement standards impose risk on the general 
partner that effects incentives.62  (We would be eager to learn 
whether any funds have actually adopted such a compensation 
scheme and how the social impact is measured for compensation 
purposes.)   
• Third, make sure that the fund manager is using appropriate 
benchmarks for the fund’s performance.  The appropriate 
benchmark against which to evaluate private investments is other 
private investments, including the significant illiquidity premium 
associated with such investments.   
                                                                                                             
62 See Bengt Holstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979). 
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• Fourth, treat the presence of any public equities in a self-styled 
impact fund as the thirteenth strike of the clock, which calls the 
others into question.63 
• Finally, the socially-screened ESG mutual fund industry should 
be regarded as offering investors a value alignment strategy, not 
an impact investment strategy.  Prospective investors in such 
funds should take care to understand the premium expense ratios 
charged by the sponsors of such funds, the sacrifice in 
diversification these funds may incur and the financial 
engineering employed to offset the diminished diversification.  
Investors should also be skeptical of claims of impact that may 
appear in the marketing materials for such funds. 
 
                                                                                                             
63 This is not to say that an investor should shun a portfolio that includes socially-neutral 
as well as socially-motivated investments, as well as investments aimed at value alignment and value 
creation.  The most straightforward way to do this is through investments in separate funds, each of 
which describes it purpose, expected financial return, and (in the case of an impact fund) how its 
impact will be measured. 
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